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Mixture toxicity, cumulative risk, 
and environmental justice in United States 
federal policy, 1980–2016
Why, with much known, was little done?
Robert Hunt Sprinkle1*  and Devon C. Payne‑Sturges2  
Abstract 
Toxic chemicals — “toxicants” — have been studied and regulated as single entities, and, carcinogens aside, almost all 
toxicants, single or mixed and however altered, have been thought harmless in very low doses or very weak con‑
centrations. Yet much work in recent decades has shown that toxicants can injure wildlife, laboratory animals, and 
humans following exposures previously expected to be harmless. Additional work has shown that toxicants can act 
not only individually and cumulatively but also collectively and even synergistically and that they affect disadvan‑
taged communities inordinately — and therefore, as argued by reformers, unjustly. As late as December 2016, the last 
full month before the inauguration of a president promising to rescind major environmental regulations, the United 
States federal environmental‑health establishment, as led by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), had not 
developed coherent strategies to mitigate such risks, to alert the public to their plausibility, or to advise leadership 
in government and industry about their implications. To understand why, we examined archival materials, reviewed 
online databases, read internal industry communications, and interviewed experts. We confirmed that external 
constraints, statutory and judicial, had been in place prior to EPA’s earliest interest in mixture toxicity, but we found 
no overt effort, certainly no successful effort, to loosen those constraints. We also found internal constraints: concerns 
that fully committing to the study of complex mixtures involving numerous toxicants would lead to methodological 
drift within the toxicological community and that trying to act on insights from such study could lead only to regula‑
tory futility. Interaction of these constraints, external and internal, shielded the EPA by circumscribing its responsibili‑
ties and by impeding movement toward paradigmatic adjustment, but it also perpetuated scientifically dubious 
policies, such as those limiting the evaluation of commercial chemical formulations, including pesticide formulations, 
to only those ingredients said by their manufacturers to be active. In this context, regulators’ disregard of synergism 
contrasted irreconcilably with biocide manufacturers’ understanding that synergism enhanced lethality and patent‑
ability. In the end, an effective national response to mixture toxicity, cumulative risk, and environmental injustice did 
not emerge. In parallel, though, the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, which was less constrained, 
pursued with scientific investigation what the EPA had not pursued with regulatory action.
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Background
Toxic chemicals — “toxicants” — in environmental media 
act and interact and are acted upon, some persisting 
unchanged, others changing predictably or unpredict-
ably, uncounted numbers mixing in uncontrolled propor-
tions with numerous traces co-accumulating in animals, 
including humans, with low-dose individual and synergis-
tic effects reported by reputable laboratories. These facts 
and their implications have been studied for decades [1], 
in recent years with some urgency, questions now probing 
gestational, developmental, and latent reproductive and 
oncogenic consequences. Concern has grown especially 
pronounced within, and on behalf of, disadvantaged com-
munities with presumptively chronic toxicant exposures 
and demonstrably poor health [2]. Citizens there have 
been advancing inequity arguments on an environmental-
justice basis and implicating chemical and nonchemical 
stressors on a cumulative-risk basis [3].
Mixture toxicity, cumulative risk, and related findings 
— low-dose effects, synergism, endocrine disruption, 
inordinate exposures in poorer-paying jobs and poorer 
neighborhoods — have elicited various responses: disin-
terest, dismissal, confusion, alarm. What these findings 
have not elicited has been a consistent response within the 
United States federal environmental-health establishment. 
Within that establishment are leading and subsidiary units. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) monitors 
environmental quality, enforces standards in accordance 
with statutes and rulings, regulates pesticides, maintains 
inventories of chemicals and toxic releases, and conducts 
laboratory testing, scientific research, and environmental 
education. The National Institute of Environmental Health 
Sciences (NIEHS) conducts and funds research probing 
the human health effects of environmental exposures; its 
Superfund Research Program (SRP) studies contaminated 
sites and their remediation, and its National Toxicology 
Program (NTP) develops analytical innovations and main-
tains a registry of carcinogens. The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) includes two environmen-
tally oriented subsidiaries: the Agency for Toxic Sub-
stances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), an advisory and 
non-regulatory unit focused on hazardous waste, and the 
National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH), whose 
core commitment is to protect from certain environmental 
hazards the public’s vulnerable subpopulations: the young, 
the old, and the disabled [4] but not disadvantaged com-
munities as such. Between and among these units respon-
sibilities have overlapped, and contrasts have emerged.
As late as December 2016, the EPA, bearing primary 
federal environmental regulatory responsibility, had not 
developed a coherent strategy to mitigate mixture toxic-
ity and cumulative risk, to alert the public to their plausi-
bility, or to advise leadership in government and industry 
about their ramifications. Then, a month later, with the 
inauguration of a new president, environmental regula-
tion itself became the first focus of an intensive effort to 
loosen restrictions on industrial and commercial activi-
ties, an effort, in sum, to accept more risks and reduce 
fewer [5]. We have examined the 36  years — six presi-
dential administrations, from Carter through Obama — 
prior to this discontinuity.
During this period, 1980–2016, when initiatives might 
have advanced, stasis prevailed, even as an empirical 
premise for action had been converging, as sampled here, 
from three different directions: field study, epidemiologi-
cal study, and experimental study.
Field study had found abnormal development, includ-
ing intersex anatomy, physiology, and behavior, among 
aquatic animals and their predators in watersheds subject 
to point-source [6] and non-point-source [7, 8] pollution. 
Study of surface-water toxicants followed by experimen-
tal study of fish exposed embryonically to those toxicants 
in environmentally documented concentrations had 
found the adverse effects of a mixed exposure unpre-
dicted by toxicant additivity [9–13].
Epidemiological study had found differential risk for 
urogenital abnormalities in children of countries similar 
in most respects but hosting dissimilar dominant indus-
tries [14, 15], and mothers in these countries had been 
found to express breast milk showing country-specific 
signatures of multiple endocrine disrupting chemicals 
[16]. Cohort comparison had found reproductive abnor-
malities, notably oligospermia, in men known to have 
been exposed to dioxins during gestation in Seveso, Italy 
[17], or to perfluorinated alkyl acids during gestation 
in Denmark [18]. Surveillance in the United States had 
found these particular toxicants and various other toxi-
cants co-occurring — somatically “mixing” — in most 
pregnant women sampled. Blood drawn from women, 
pregnant and nonpregnant, during the National Health 
and Nutritional Examination Survey (NHANES) 2003–
2004 had been assayed for 163 environmental toxicants 
of 12 classes in combinations limited to 71 toxicants at a 
time; pregnant women assayed for 71 toxicants carried a 
burden ranging from 35 to 60 with a median of 50 [19].
Experimental study had often found disturbing effects. 
Mixtures of homologous oil shale components had 
proved additively toxic to marine bacteria, but mixtures 
of non-homologous components, even of structural 
isomers, had proved synergistically toxic [20]. Many 
environmental toxicants had exhibited low-dose non-
threshold effects [21–24]. Systematic review had found 
numerous examples of environmental toxicants produc-
ing hormone-like nonmonotonic dose–response curves 
[25] and low-dose effects [26]. These observations had 
made little sense in toxicology, but they had made good 
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sense in endocrinology [27] and promised to do so in 
allied fields, provoking an aggressive rebuttal by private 
consultants funded by the American Chemistry Council 
[28, 29]. In rat pups following developmental exposures 
to mixtures of mechanistically dissimilar antiandrogens 
in doses individually expected to show no adverse effect, 
anatomical abnormalities had been found, implying syn-
ergistic, rather than simply additive, harm [30]. Exposure 
to mixed environmental toxicants in rats had correlated 
with reproductive pathologies manifesting across three 
generations in environmentally unexposed pups, with 
exposure-specific epigenetic biomarkers linking ances-
tral exposures to adult-onset disease in subsequent gen-
erations [31]. Similar work likewise had found that “a 
mixture of plastic derived compounds … can promote 
epigenetic transgenerational inheritance of adult onset 
disease” [32]. Different in focus and scale had been the 
Halifax Project, a global carcinogenicity review by 173 
co-authors. Its conclusion, reported in 2015, had been 
admonitory: “Our current understanding of the biology 
of cancer suggests that the cumulative effects of (non-
carcinogenic) chemicals acting on different pathways that 
are relevant to cancer, and on a variety of cancer-relevant 
systems, organs, tissues and cells could conspire to pro-
duce carcinogenic synergies that will be overlooked using 
current risk assessment methods” [33].
Why, with much known, was little done? This question, 
to our knowledge, has not previously been posed across 
disciplines and decades. Its answer should help explain 
how scientific understanding and regulatory response 
diverged and how their divergence may yet be narrowed.
Methods
We accessed holdings of the National Archives and 
Records Administration to examine documents, pub-
lished and unpublished, deposited by or relating to the 
EPA and allied bodies from 1980 to 1986, the period 
when mixtures policy was forming and mixtures guide-
lines were being written. We analyzed the development, 
provisions, and consequences of six federal statutes 
enacted from 1972 through 2016, one Supreme Court 
ruling from 1980, and one presidential Executive Order 
from 1994. To study the legislative history of the Food 
Quality Protection Act, the federal statute that in 1996 
introduced cumulative-risk and aggregate-risk obliga-
tions, we accessed United States Senate archives; com-
plementary House of Representatives archives remained 
under embargo. We inspected one herbicide manufac-
turer’s internal communications released fortuitously 
through court order. We reviewed policy statements 
and framework documents and seven National Research 
Council advisory studies and assessed their influence. 
We searched PubMed.gov for “environmental mixture 
toxicity”, “cumulative risk”, “environmental justice”, and 
numerous narrower associated terms, concentrating 
on the 1980–2016 period and examining scientific evi-
dence, topical reviews, and expert commentaries that 
either motivated or illuminated the policy history being 
probed. We did not conduct a systematic review of these 
literatures, nor did we conduct a meta-analysis. To sup-
plement objective findings, and in a manner compliant 
with requirements of our Institutional Review Board, we 
interviewed four topic experts, three of them participants 
in the development and implementation of the policies 
investigated. The authors throughout collaborated to 
identify and pursue emergent themes.
Findings
We present our findings narratively over time, tracing 
statutory, judicial, methodological, political, scientific, 
and regulatory factors as they came to prominence and 
as they interacted. Interviews are placed where most 
pertinent.
Complexities encountered
Scientific interest in mixture toxicity had increased 
enough by 1952 to warrant comprehensive review and 
theoretical specification, with interactions — synergism 
and antagonism — modeled mathematically and cumula-
tive risk promoted presciently as a topic for future study 
[34]. Yet policy interest was slow to grow. What “slow” 
indicated might have been skepticism, but it might also 
have been disorientation. Thousands of industrial chemi-
cals, many unstudied either toxicologically or epidemio-
logically, were mixing and reacting in uncertain numbers 
and at unknown concentrations in varying physical condi-
tions while subject to microbial and higher-order metabo-
lism. Then, altered or not, mixed or not, they were being 
contacted in exposures once expected to be harmless but 
now suspected to be harmful, whether during gestation 
and childhood or later over the lifespan. And all this had 
been happening, gradually or repeatedly, on watershed 
and airshed scales, even on whole-population scales, mak-
ing epidemiological inference overly dependent on histori-
cal trends. Most disorienting might have been the growing 
realization that the ability to metabolize these chemicals 
safely was not uniform; it varied substantially, even drasti-
cally, species-to-species and person-to-person [35].
The EPA, formed 2 December 1970, focused initially 
on pollution at its sources: stack emissions, industrial 
and municipal effluents, pesticides applied to crops, 
and chemicals spilled onto land or into water. Imme-
diate problems were not subtle, and “risk” was rarely 
mentioned. As multiple low-dose exposures to unfamil-
iar and poorly characterized chemicals became appreci-
ated as commonplace, a new concept, “risk assessment”, 
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took shape [36]. EPA’s core analytical discipline became 
toxicology, the laboratory science committed to char-
acterizing noxious exposures and their effects in liv-
ing organisms. A noxious chemical pollutant was to be 
managed either by banning it outright or by making its 
further use tolerable through regulation, often direct-
ing that best available technologies be employed for 
production, storage, application, and disposal. This sec-
ond approach, “command and control” with continued 
use, conceded accumulation but, if vigorously applied, 
could slow it down. Carcinogens got the most atten-
tion, but, public concern aside, industry expected a sci-
entific rationale for any regulation imposing economic 
costs [37].
The EPA soon had additional responsibilities and, 
regarding chemical formulations, peculiar constraints. 
The Federal Insecticide Act of 1910 had been amended 
as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act of 1947 (FIFRA) [38], essentially a truth-in-labeling 
law [39]. FIFRA was then to be amended transforma-
tionally by the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control 
Act of 1972 [40], which moved FIFRA’s administration 
from the Department of Agriculture to the EPA and 
adjusted the law’s focus to match the agency’s protec-
tive mission.
In the new FIFRA, foundational definitions appeared. 
“Active ingredient … in the case of a pesticide” was 
defined as “an ingredient which will prevent, destroy, 
repel, or mitigate any pest”. “Inert ingredient” was defined 
as “an ingredient which is not active”. And “pesticide” 
itself was defined as “(1) any substance or mixture of sub-
stances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or 
mitigating any pest, and (2) any substance or mixture of 
substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoli-
ant, or desiccant”. A pesticide, then, even if a mixture of 
ingredients “active” and “inert”, was, for regulatory pur-
poses, unitary, and in this respect the EPA’s purview was 
to be “any pesticide if it contains any new active ingredi-
ent or if it would entail a changed use pattern” [40].
Then, in 1976, the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA; colloquially, “Tosca”) [41], entered law and 
named the EPA as its administrative agency. While seem-
ing to regulate “chemical substances and mixtures” in 
detail, TSCA, in Sect. 3, excluded from the definition of 
“chemical substance” not only “any mixture” — an intui-
tive exclusion — but also “any pesticide (as defined in 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act) 
when manufactured, processed, or distributed in com-
merce for use as a pesticide”. FIFRA had said a pesticide 
could be a chemical substance or a mixture of chemical 
substances, but now in TSCA a pesticide would not be 
considered a chemical substance [42]. Pesticides, then, 
could neither be mixtures nor form mixtures.
TSCA went on, still in Sect. 3, to define “mixture” tor-
tuously and, one may suspect, tendentiously:
(8) The term “mixture” means any combination of 
two or more chemical substances if the combination 
does not occur in nature and is not, in whole or in 
part, the result of a chemical reaction; except that 
such term [“mixture”] does include any combination 
which occurs, in whole or in part, as a result of a 
chemical reaction if none of the chemical substances 
comprising the combination is a new chemical sub-
stance and if the combination could have been man-
ufactured for commercial purposes without a chemi-
cal reaction at the time the chemical substances 
comprising the combination were combined.
(9) The term “new chemical substance” means any 
chemical substance which is not included in the 
chemical substance list compiled and published 
under Sect. 8 (b) [43].
Untwisting these passages suggests their authors’ 
intent. No mixture could “occur in nature”, so at least 
one of any mixture’s chemical components had to be an 
industrial substance. No component could be “the result 
of a chemical reaction” without meeting two require-
ments. The “result” could not be “a new chemical sub-
stance”, a term paragraph (9), above, would define as a 
chemical not officially listed, and “the combination” had 
to be one that “could have been manufactured for com-
mercial purposes without a chemical reaction”. So, really, 
all components had to be industrial substances, and that 
conclusion may tell why no guidance explained how two 
or more industrial substances could be declared a mix-
ture when found among myriad natural substances; no 
guidance was needed. An environmental mixture could 
not be, in TSCA terms, a “mixture” if its components 
included chemical substances altered in the environment. 
Nor could the still toxic breakdown products of two dif-
ferent industrial substances constitute a mixture.
These paragraphs, shrewdly crafted, could not have 
made environmental sense to drafters and legislators 
and regulators but would have made sense of other 
sorts. Polluters’ liability risks would have been easier 
to foresee, and to avoid, with mixtures defined restric-
tively. And the EPA’s responsibility to study real mix-
tures in real environments would have been diminished.
Might statutory intent still be honored if mixtures were 
studied in laboratories? Yes. TSCA expressly required the 
testing of a mixture per se when prior knowledge of its 
individual components seemed a poor guide to under-
standing: “If the Administrator finds that … in the case 
of mixtures, the effects … on health or the environment 
may not be reasonably and more efficiently determined 
or predicted by testing the chemical substances which 
Page 5 of 25Sprinkle and Payne‑Sturges  Environ Health          (2021) 20:104  
comprise the mixture[,] the Administrator shall by rule 
require that testing be conducted” [44]. To the adminis-
trator’s many authorities, explicit and implicit, had been 
added one more explicitly, but, given the narrowness 
with which “mixture” was being defined, this particular 
authority hardly mattered. In practice, the EPA was being 
authorized, absent the administrator’s objection, to assess 
any mixture as if its separately identifiable components 
were acting in isolation both from nature and from each 
other, and those components — with “new chemical sub-
stances” excluded — would already be known. Were the 
administrator to object or were in-house agency prac-
tice to move toward more speculative evaluation, insight 
could still be gained, but constraints on regulation would 
remain.
On 2 July 1980, for reasons unrelated to mixtures, 
risk assessment began assuming a more prominent role 
in federal regulatory process. The Supreme Court ruled 
in “the Benzene Decision” — Industrial Union Depart-
ment, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute — that 
toxicant-specific quantitative risk assessment was neces-
sary to justify regulatory intervention at any particular 
exposure level [45]. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), a unit in the Department of 
Labor, had tried to restrict occupational exposure to 
benzene to “the lowest technologically feasible level that 
will not impair the viability of the industries regulated”. 
A 5-to-4 court majority instead required OSHA to prove 
that exposure at a specific level would pose a significant 
risk before prohibiting exposure at-or-above that level. 
No campaign to minimize emissions or exposures would 
henceforth be permitted, nor would any insistence that 
pollution-control methods be improved simply because 
better technology had become available. The Court, keen 
to unburden industry, did not have its pick of molecu-
lar protagonists, yet benzene was tragically miscast as a 
typical poison. As the Court was made aware, benzene 
was carcinogenic, so OSHA could cite no threshold level 
below which exposures would be safe. Nevertheless, 
as three of the five justices in the majority complained, 
“The burden was on OSHA to show … a significant risk. 
Here, OSHA did not even attempt to carry such burden 
of proof” [45]. Any agency motivated to formulate a low-
est-technologically-feasible-level standard and explain its 
rationale cogently would be welcome to try, with seven of 
nine justices predisposed to be persuadable.
In the mean time, which would extend to the present 
day, the ruling would remain in force. The lowest-tech-
nologically-feasible-level standard would be disallowed 
for any specified toxicant, at least when alone and, pre-
sumably, when mixed. Demonstrating harm at-or-above 
any certain exposure would not imply that all lower 
exposures would be harmless. Yet all lower exposures 
would have to be allowed.
The Benzene Decision was pivotal. Quantitative risk 
assessment became necessary prior to regulatory inter-
vention, which could be justified only when based on a 
study detecting a risk unambiguously. A study powered 
to detect a risk justifying intervention at a lower exposure 
would presumably have to be larger and slower and more 
costly and, if a trend toward toxicity were to fail tests of 
statistical significance, would prove useless. The Benzene 
Decision would make coming concerns — toxicity at very 
low doses, complexity of environmental mixtures, endo-
crine disruption in fetal life, and so forth — difficult to 
address in regulation, even difficult to envision in regula-
tory context.
Five months after the Benzene Decision, on 11 
December 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed into 
law the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), better 
known as “Superfund”. CERCLA organized the EPA’s 
approach to reclamation following industrial or acci-
dental contamination. It tasked the EPA with assessing 
and managing severely polluted sites by removing haz-
ardous materials and remediating their residual effects. 
Since many of these sites had been contaminated by 
multiple toxicants over long periods, remediation would 
require that chronic exposure to low-dose environmen-
tal chemical mixtures be understood in toxicological 
terms.
Also coming in 1980, although not in print until 30 
April 1981, was a National Research Council (NRC) case 
study of United States Coast Guard officers’ exposures 
to cargo-hold vapors and the toxicological interactions 
made likely by such exposures [46]. Herein toxicologi-
cal interaction was defined, mathematical models were 
specified, and data gaps were delineated. Persistent 
under-attention to toxicants’ interactions was noted, 
ruefully [47], but “[u]ntil more specific information 
becomes available, it seems that the most productive 
course to follow to determine limits for multiple expo-
sures is to assume additivity and follow the guidelines 
for mixtures as recommended by the American Confer-
ence of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (1977)” [48]. 
An extensive program of laboratory research was envi-
sioned to test toxicant pairs over their dosage ranges with 
explicit attention to “reactive intermediates and tests for 
myoneural conduction, altered behavior, two-stage car-
cinogenesis, mutagenesis, teratogenesis, [and] effects on 
reproduction” [49]. The Coast Guard was advised to “col-
laborate with organizations such as the National Library 
of Medicine, the Oak Ridge Toxicology Information 
Response Center, and other groups” [49]. The EPA was 
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not mentioned, nor had it been represented among par-
ticipants, but it did have this report on file [50].
Around the same time, with the NRC’s assistance, a 
prior disaster — a calamitous multigenerational natu-
ral experiment — was being re-examined. Appearing 17 
June 1982 was the result, Assessment of Multichemical 
Contamination: Proceedings of an International Work-
shop, Milan, Italy, April 28–30, 1981. The disaster under 
review had been a 1976 industrial dioxin accident in 
Seveso, Italy. Among the workshop’s findings was this: 
“Chemicals released into the air, surface waters, and soil 
will generally react with other chemicals in those media. 
The resulting products will frequently react with other 
chemicals, and complex series of reaction may continue 
along extended physical transport pathways before the 
materials find semipermanent storage sites in terrestrial 
soils or aquatic sediments” [51]. In these two sentences 
was summarized the rationale that had led to Superfund.
In a different section was another sentence that should 
have made an abiding impression. It concerned isomers, 
spontaneously twinned molecules identical in atomic 
composition but not identical in atomic conformation — 
or, often, in toxicity. Many chemicals were “chiral”, mean-
ing “handed”. They were “left-handed” and “right-handed” 
isomers mixed together. Manufacturers, including phar-
maceutical firms, were often unaware of or unconcerned 
about isomerization or unable to evaluate or avoid it 
profitably. “This is significant for environmental chemis-
try”, warned the Seveso report, “as there are many cases 
in which different isomers of a basic structure can have 
vastly different biological properties, including toxicity” 
[52]. The EPA did have this Seveso report on file [53].
Lessons being learned in the Coast Guard and Seveso 
studies were ones the EPA’s toxicologists could read but 
not ones the EPA as an agency could apply to its regula-
tory mission, against whose constraints Superfund was 
already straining.
To help it understand its evolving responsibilities, the 
EPA held a workshop 29–30 September 1982 in Cincin-
nati, Ohio, the second day addressing “Health Assess-
ment of Exposures to Chemical Mixtures” [54]. Only 
“about a half dozen Superfund-designated sites” had so 
far been investigated, and in “some easily identified sites” 
only one or two “marker chemicals” had “dominated the 
situation” [55], but more difficult cases had to be antici-
pated. Presenters favored methods ranging from site-by-
site, exposure-by-exposure, subject-by-subject analysis 
to complex mathematical modeling of toxicant interac-
tions. One participant objected that “Any argument for 
toxic interaction stands on weak ground unless com-
pounds are naturally reactive in some manner” [56], but 
another objected from a contrasting perspective, saying 
“I was disappointed that the second day of the workshop 
was devoted almost entirely to 2-chemical interactions, 
since we live in an N-chemical world” [57]. In the second 
day’s summation, “It was pointed out that experimental 
designs for [multichemical interactions] were extremely 
complex, required very large numbers of [experimental] 
animals, and were not likely to be done. … The math-
ematical modeling … is quite complicated” [58]. The 
prevailing metaphor at this meeting was still laboratory 
toxicology, not yet environmental chemistry and never 
epidemiology or public health. No consensus emerged.
The next year, 1983, the NRC published Risk Assess-
ment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process 
[59], a report intended for all risk-assessing agencies. 
Within the EPA, it was one of several unrelated reports 
called “The Red Book”. This particular “Red Book” was 
a 191-page manual, still used, that standardized risk-
assessment practices. Mixture-related apprehensions 
remained subliminal except on two pages:
[T]he latent period between exposure and disease is 
long, and exposures are mixed and multiple. Thus, 
epidemiologic [sic] data require careful interpreta-
tion. Even if these problems are solved satisfactorily, 
the preponderance of chemicals in the environment 
has not been studied with epidemiologic methods, 
and we would not wish to release newly produced 
substances only to discover years later that they 
were powerful carcinogenic agents. These limitations 
require reliance on less direct evidence that a health 
hazard exists [60]. … The importance of exposures to 
a mixture of carcinogens is another factor that needs 
to be considered in assign [sic] human exposures. For 
example, exposure to cigarette smoke and asbestos 
gives an incidence of cancer that is much greater 
than anticipated from carcinogenicity data on each 
substance individually. Because data detecting such 
synergistic effects are often unavailable, they are 
often ignored or accounted for by the use of vari-
ous safety factors [such as dividing a no-observed-
adverse-effect-level dose, a NOAEL dose, by 10] [61].
Parenthetically, cigarette smoke, mentioned above, 
was not an individual substance but was already known 
to be a mixture of toxicants [62], even a mixture of car-
cinogens, including polonium-210 [63]. That irony aside, 
the Red Book’s emphasis continued to be assessment of 
the human health risks presented by exposure to single 
chemicals, and the EPA would adopt and maintain that 
emphasis.
Within a year, though, mixture-related apprehensions 
would cease to be subliminal. Whatever statutes required 
regulatory science could fulfill. Whatever statutes and the 
Supreme Court forbade regulatory science could avoid. 
But regulatory science was science: it needed to know. 
Page 7 of 25Sprinkle and Payne‑Sturges  Environ Health          (2021) 20:104  
And at this juncture it knew that linear regulatory policy 
was about to meet non-linear unregulated nature — pol-
luted nature — and would have to adapt.
Guidelines proposed
Thousands of hazardous waste sites, known generically 
as “Superfund sites”, had been contaminated with multi-
ple chemicals and required risk prioritization to account 
for mixtures. Chemical-by-chemical risk assessment, 
environmental toxicology’s standard deliverable, had to 
be rethought [64]. In January 1984, the EPA formed the 
Agency Working Group on Risk Assessment Guidelines, 
and by August a first draft of a guidelines document was 
finished.
Few toxicants had ever been evaluated in pairs, fewer 
still, if any, in complex mixtures. Would addition — 
adding the doses of sufficiently similar chemicals or 
somehow adding their effects — be good enough? Not 
generally; a simplifying restriction to similars would 
make addition practically useless in many environmen-
tal field-work settings. And as evident pharmacologi-
cally, small differences between similar molecules could 
generate markedly dissimilar effects; for instance, folic 
acid, taken as a vitamin, and methotrexate, taken as an 
anti-cancer drug, were almost identical — so similar that 
enzymes requiring the former were competitively inhib-
ited by the latter [65]. Mathematical complexity discour-
aged the addition of a third chemical and precluded the 
addition of an nth; any combination assessed for cumula-
tive risk would be arbitrarily small. Most glaringly when 
the subject was mixtures, addition’s limitations led the 
Agency Working Group to ignore interaction, whether 
potentiation or synergism or antagonism. In the end, the 
Agency Working Group chose to dismiss interaction not 
as a possibility but as a topic:
Previous drafts of the document contained a lengthy 
discussion of the biological and chemical bases of 
toxicant interactions. The Agency Working Group 
felt that the discussion detracted from, rather than 
added to[,] the clarity of the document, and this sec-
tion was deleted. The literature cited in the docu-
ment provides a detailed discussion of this issue for 
the interested reader [66].
The Agency Working Group conceded that a two-
component “mixture of concern”, if well enough char-
acterized, might be considered a single compound, as if 
it were an ordinary toxicant or carcinogen evaluated for 
subchronic or chronic effects; dose-additive equations 
could be modified and interaction could be built in 
rather than modeled [67]. Not recalled here was TSCA’s 
stipulation that the term “chemical substance” could 
not include “any mixture” [68]. The Agency Working 
Group authors went on to concede that “the default 
position”, which had become dose additivity, was “based 
on the assumption that the components in the mix-
ture have the same mode of action and elicit the same 
effects”, but “[t]his [similarity] assumption will not hold 
true in most cases, at least for complex mixtures of sys-
temic toxicants” [69].
With the interactions discussion deleted, with sim-
ple assumptions modeling complex realities, and with 
no answer for most cases, the document went out for 
external peer review. Misgivings were many and criti-
cisms sharp.
Most problematic for the Agency Working Group 
were the comments of Ellen Silbergeld, PhD, an envi-
ronmental engineer and, at the time, Chief Toxics Sci-
entist at the Environmental Defense Fund. “You will 
note that these comments are not supportive”, she 
wrote, 23 August 1984, and then in pen added a mar-
ginal comment: “I consider them unrealistic, since their 
explicit limitations make them difficult to apply in most 
situations facing the EPA”. What she had read was a 
plan not to grasp an exponential reality but to patch a 
linear algorithm.
She continued:
I am deeply concerned by the implications of these 
guidelines, and I would recommend that they be 
withdrawn for further refinement. In their present 
state they are unclear and unscientific for the rea-
sons described herein. … Clearly, many interactions 
of humans and the ecosystem are with mixtures, 
rather than pure compounds. The difficulty of deal-
ing with this problem is compounded by the fact that 
we remain alarmingly ignorant of the toxicity of the 
majority of chemicals used in our environment … . 
Thus it is perhaps premature to expect that we can 
accurately assess the threat of mixtures of chemi-
cals, when we partially understand only about 10% 
of existing chemicals taken one at a time. … Even 
when specific exposures can be defined — such as 
lead in air — these exposures occur in the context 
of concurrent exposures, from other sources, to a 
multiplicity of chemicals. Thus these guidelines are 
arguably the most important developed by EPA. … 
Unfortunately, the present guidelines fall short of 
providing scientifically reasonable or truly protective 
approaches[.] It is clearly stated … that synergism 
(interactions other than additive) will not be consid-
ered in these guidelines. There is little justification 
for this policy decision, to reject any incorporation 
of models of other than additive interactions among 
toxicants. … [I]f interactions can be demonstrated, 
then equations other than those built around addi-
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tivity must (rather than may) be used. The further 
discussion of possible (undemonstrated) interfer-
ences yielding less than additivity is suggested [dis-
ingenuously] to discount this obligation [to model 
synergism]. This is consistent with the whole thrust 
of this document[, which] is to exclude quantifica-
tion other than additivity. … [This is] unaccepta-
ble[.] … In my opinion, most toxicant interactions 
occur because two or more chemicals affect the same 
organ system, through action at different receptor 
sites or cellular targets. … [This document is] sci-
entifically unsubstantiated … [and based upon a] 
pathetically incomplete database … [and is] severely 
limited … [by too] many unhelpful comments. … It 
is commendable that the document admits that the 
assumptions underlying dose additivity “will not 
hold true in most cases”. However, no guidance is 
given to deal with these (majority) of cases. … [This 
is] a remarkably inflexible statement … [I am v]ery 
critical of the mathematical models … [which are 
based on] a simplistic assumption that because two 
compounds may antagonize each other at one site of 
action, they have no other affects [sic] which require 
assessment [70].
Though Dr. Silbergeld’s analysis stood out as the stiff-
est challenge to the Agency Working Group’s process 
and product, no reviewer was wholly supportive. That 
said, Dr. Earl C. Spurrier, writing 11 March 1985 for 
the National Agricultural Chemical Association, whose 
member firms sold chemical formulations — pesticides 
— expressly intended for environmental use, did seem 
appreciative. He conceded that pesticides were sure to 
mix in unaccountable ways ineluctably associated with 
the food chain. But his focus was not on the role of pesti-
cides in mixtures; his focus was on the likely future status 
of pesticides as mixtures — as mixtures themselves — if 
statutory protections were ever weakened. Dr. Spurrier 
saw a safe harbor just beyond the EPA’s methodologi-
cal mist. Reasoning backwards from dose additivity to 
the similarity assumption that under special conditions 
might make dose additivity defensible, he asserted that 
pesticide formulations could not be evaluated as mix-
tures because their constituent chemicals, each added 
for a reason, were all dissimilar, one from another [71]. 
Dr. Spurrier’s paradox, however preposterous, was fairly 
stated. It elicited no rebuttal. Implicit was this hypoth-
esis: even if statutes were amended to acknowledge pesti-
cide formulations as mixtures, the EPA would not be able 
to adjust its methods. It would still regulate pesticides 
as single entities accompanied by nonentities, “declared 
active principal ingredients” sharing containers with sup-
posedly “inert” co-formulants.
Guidelines approved
The following month, on 22–23 April 1985, the EPA’s Sci-
ence Advisory Board Risk Assessment Guidelines Review 
Group convened in Washington as the Complex Mix-
tures Panel.
Fourteen panelists, five from the EPA, three from 
industry, attended the first day [72], which began acri-
moniously. The EPA could present few relevant data, not 
even exposure data, and was pressing for chemical-mix-
tures risk-assessment guidelines based only on studies 
of single agents [73]. Dr. Robert Scala, a biologist repre-
senting the Exxon Corporation, quickly remarked that 
hydrocarbon mixtures, with as many as “240 identifiable 
materials”, exemplified additivity’s inadequacy [74]. The 
most salient comments on the guideline’s first draft, he 
added, had been Dr. Silbergeld’s. “They were beautifully 
written by a woman scientist who clearly understands 
what she’s talking about” [75].
Assessment of Superfund sites typically presented mix-
tures involving many chemicals, but panelists had been 
“required to do something”, said Dr. Jerry Stara of the 
EPA, even while studies of two or three chemicals and 
“the whole interaction base for reactivity together — in 
other words, synergism” were still underway [76]. Dr. 
Scala found additional targets, objecting “That a num-
ber which has its uncertainty plus or minus the universe 
isn’t a particularly valuable number [77]… I mean, it’s the 
worst of all possible worlds, where you have written your 
regulation and now you’re going to go down to the labora-
tory and do some experiments to justify it. … I mean, is 
the public pressure, is the societal need so great that we 
cannot take a few years on complex mixtures and do some 
experiments and erect the theory? … Get some real-world 
materials, go out and test them, and see what you learn. 
I’m sorry — that’s what science is about” [78]. Dr. Stara 
agreed, noting that Love Canal — the Hooker Chemical 
Company dump site near Niagara Falls, New York, notori-
ous as Superfund’s first reclamation project — mixed 26 
chemicals, which was far more than guidelines could ever 
model [79]. Dr. Scala then objected that Love Canal’s dan-
gers had been “blown out of all proportion. … Essentially 
there was nothing proved, particularly in the reproductive 
area. Nothing proved. Nothing established scientifically 
[80]. … Science has been prostituted to come up with 
some kind of a figure which was really essentially a policy 
judgment” [81]. Dr. Stara conceded that “we are pushed 
so hard — and maybe I shouldn’t say this much for the 
record — by the regulators to produce something” [82].
Discussion turned to Dr. Silbergeld’s objections, 
which were accepted as valid but around which some 
way had to be found to avoid abandoning the guide-
lines project entirely. Dr. Stara had spoken with Dr. 
Silbergeld and reported that if “a dozen changes” were 
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to be made “then she would agree to putting the guide-
lines out, you know. … Actually, we don’t need to worry 
about that right now because she will be out of com-
mission for a year or two”. The meeting transcript here 
recorded “(Laughter)”, after which another panelist 
from the EPA added, “Probably three months or so” 
[83]. Dr. Silbergeld was in week 29 of a normal term 
pregnancy [84].
Five panelists attended the second day [85], which 
began well. Dr. Silbergeld had now “sort of bought in”, 
Dr. Scala reported [86]. She might support the guidelines 
document if it appended a “technical report” [87].
Four panelists, Dr. Stara the one excluded, proceeded to 
confer and write [88]. Dr. Scala, who by now was design-
ing the group’s default assessment algorithm, explained, 
“When I default to no risk assessment, it says: You have 
data on only a small fraction of components” [89]. Dr. 
James Whittenberger, an occupational-health expert and 
the panel’s chairman, responded “They’re worried about 
acceptance of that one in the agency, although they say 
they agree with it” [90]. Dr. Scala then reassured Dr. 
Whittenberger that EPA professionals knew they were 
unprepared to perform risk assessment on complex mix-
tures but cautioned that their “employers” and “agency 
policy” might nonetheless prevail [91]. Dr. Scala offered 
an insight: “The other guidelines — mutagenicity, car-
cinogenicity, developmental — deal with an end effect, 
and we deal with the modality, the causative agent” [92]. 
Indeed, other than in the simplest cases, end effects were 
not known.
These four panelists then began to devise ways to 
explain why the product of their efforts would not prove 
satisfactory. Dr. Whittenberger advised that “whatever 
statement we make here will determine whether the 
agency can continue to use these interim guidelines. … 
[T]hat’s what they told me a few minutes ago. … If we say 
we think it’s adequate with modifications and should be 
used, that would keep them in business” [93].
The archival record of this 2-day meeting of the Com-
plex Mixtures Panel nowhere recorded any participant 
contending that mixture toxicity was a myth, although 
Dr. Scala’s dismissal of the Love Canal experience came 
close. Nor did any participant contend that Superfund 
obligations could be met while ignoring complex mix-
tures, that current laboratory practices could meet the 
task posed even by simple mixtures, that Dr. Silbergeld’s 
excoriating review was fallacious, or that the guidelines, 
as then developing, would prove genuinely useful. Even 
so, no one spoke up against Dr. Scala’s criterion with-
holding from risk assessment any mixture unless the 
EPA already had data on more than a small fraction of its 
components.
Ambivalence was not confined to the Complex Mix-
tures Panel. That same spring, 1985, William Ruck-
elshaus, an attorney and a Department of Justice 
veteran and the EPA’s first and fifth administrator, 
newly resigned after his second successful EPA tour, 
wrote this: “During the past 15 years, there has been a 
shift in public emphasis from visible and demonstra-
ble problems, such as smog from automobiles and raw 
sewage, to potential and largely invisible problems, 
such as the effects of low concentrations of toxic pollut-
ants on human health” [36]. Risk assessment had arisen 
to make sense of such concerns, but risk management 
would now force a choice between avoiding harms as 
they might be demonstrated and avoiding harms as they 
might be anticipated. Among those not often demon-
strated in the laboratory but increasingly anticipated in 
the public mind were “effects from chemicals in com-
bination that are greater than would be expected from 
the sum effects of all chemicals acting independently” 
[36]. The second choice, the anticipatory choice, would 
require, ill-advisedly he thought, that “[a]ny identifiable 
risk ought to be eliminated up to the capacity of availa-
ble technology to do so” [36]. He did not say, but he had 
to know, that the Benzene Decision put any “best availa-
ble technology” rule out of reach, but, as a legal scholar, 
he would have appreciated three justices’ concurring 
hint about avoiding that precedent in future. The federal 
environmental-health establishment, most saliently the 
EPA, was indeed constrained by the Benzene Decision, 
but remaining constrained may have been less a neces-
sity than a choice.
On 24 September 1986 in the Federal Register, the EPA 
released “Guidelines for the Health Risk Assessment of 
Chemical Mixtures” [94]. This document was, on the 
whole, reasonable, cautious, and modest, but reading 
it now with knowledge of its influence prompts several 
observations.
“Part A” presented the guidelines themselves. Forth-
rightly acknowledged was the complexity of most envi-
ronmental mixtures. Yet the approach to complexity was 
not integrative — evaluating real mixtures in real envi-
ronmental samples — but reductive to laboratory prac-
tice, evaluating minimized sets of chemicals in simplified 
ways, such as by assuming dose additivity and response 
additivity. Limitations were obvious, and warnings were 
clear — too clear for some advisors.
“Part B” was a response to comments. “Numerous 
comments were received concerning the assumption of 
additivity. … The Agency and its reviewers agree that 
as the number of compounds in the mixture increases, 
an assumption of additivity will become less reliable in 
estimating risk. … However, the Guidelines do explicitly 
state that as the number of compounds in the mixture 
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increases, the uncertainty associated with the risk assess-
ment is also likely to increase” [95]. Suggested here was 
the authors’ orientation not to the risk presented, such 
as to fish, by a complex environmental mixture, such as 
river water, but to the attribution of risk to one or two 
components of that mixture. “The Guidelines were fur-
ther clarified to state that dose (or response) additiv-
ity is theoretically sound, and therefore best applied for 
assessing mixtures of similar acting components that do 
not interact” [95]. Neither form of additivity was inher-
ently simplistic; at minimum, dose additivity could adjust 
for differences in potency, and response additivity could 
accommodate toxicants of different sorts. But advising 
that these methods were “best applied for assessing mix-
tures of similar acting components that do not interact” 
made them simplistic as policy guides and, in practice, 
unhelpful.
The isomer issue, as raised in the Seveso report, was 
not addressed. Had it been, then evaluating a mixture of 
two industrial pollutants could have meant evaluating a 
mixture of four, and four-at-a-time, while even three-at-
a-time strained preferred mathematical methods. Toxi-
cant interactions, such as synergy and competition for 
detoxifying metabolic pathways, were acknowledged 
but set aside as poorly described. Synergy — and toxic-
ity itself except for chronicity and subchronicity and car-
cinogenicity — was assumed to be extinguished at low 
doses. So was synergism’s antithesis, antagonism. Special 
vulnerabilities of the fetus and the child were not consid-
ered. A technical support document, promised to placate 
Dr. Silbergeld, was missing; in its stead was a ten-sen-
tence concluding section labeled “Need for a Technical 
Support Document” [94].
The complex-mixtures problem, brought home to the 
EPA by Superfund, pressed against the chemical-by-
chemical methods that had made toxicology a successful 
laboratory science.
A toxicant exposure could be characterized exquisitely 
in laboratory animals if studied carefully enough: one 
route, one intensity, one frequency, with individual ani-
mals as similar to each other as possible. Routes, inten-
sities, and frequencies could then be varied in different 
cohorts. Such studies might have been prompted by epi-
demiological observations but would be experimental, 
not observational, not blurred by avoidable confound-
ers. Similar studies could also function prospectively to 
screen chemicals, each one individually, for toxic effects 
in animals — or in Ames-test bacteria or in cell lines — 
and, by extension, in humans.
Toxicological methods had been developed to test 
single chemicals. Testing two or more or many chemi-
cals in various mixing ratios or testing actual environ-
mental samples would require, at best, methodological 
elaboration and would initiate, at worst, methodologi-
cal drift, a loss of procedural standardization. With pro-
spective mixture studies inherently subject to challenge 
for their selection of chemicals, for the ratios at which 
selected chemicals would be mixed, and for the targets 
exposed [96], generalizability would be hard to achieve. 
All that conceded, methods for in  vivo toxicity testing 
of complex mixtures, including environmental samples, 
were not unavailable; the National Research Council 
published a book about them in 1988 [97].
Remaining to be posted are three advisories.
First, reluctance has not been recalcitrance. For exam-
ple, as guided since 1972 by the Clean Water Act [98], 
the EPA has routinely assessed “whole-effluent toxicity” 
(WET) as a function of organismal response [99]. Plainly, 
though, effluents — liquids flowing from pipes — have 
not been the only environmental media whose organis-
mal response could be assessed.
Second, a presentist view may look back unfairly. Scien-
tific insights and technical advances in the later years of 
our study period made knowable what had been hard to 
know, or impossible to know, in the earlier years. Nota-
bly, the “omics” revolution — genomics, transcriptomics, 
proteomics, metabolomics — has expanded not only the 
questions we can answer, whether directly or indirectly, 
but also the questions we can imagine asking. The path 
from exposure to biological response to pathophysiology 
has long been followed, but following has become easier, 
not just in individual patients but also in communities 
and not just for individual toxicants but also for the mix-
tures conveyed in environmental media. Toxicant expo-
sures, from simple to complex, create metabolic profiles, 
which can suggest mechanisms of injury. Investigators 
studying environmental mixtures can now more easily 
compare metabolic profiles between and among indi-
viduals, groups, and communities differing in their expo-
sures, such as chronic exposures to ultrafine particles at 
different distances from highways [100].
Third, even if toxicologists with regulatory influence 
had not feared methodological drift but had followed 
logic and evidence to the study of risk in all its complex-
ity, the constraints, statutory and judicial, within whose 
boundaries they worked would have kept their findings 
from altering regulatory policy.
Guidelines reconsidered
Ellen Silbergeld, PhD, went on to become Professor 
of Epidemiology, Environmental Health Sciences, and 
Health Policy and Management at the Johns Hopkins 
University Bloomberg School of Public Health, author 
or co-author of roughly 500 scholarly publications, and 
recipient of, inter alia, a lifetime achievement award from 
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the Society of Toxicology and a “Genius” award from the 
MacArthur Foundation. On 6 June 2017 we met in Col-
lege Park with Dr. Silbergeld for over 2 h. She asked to be 
named and cited.
Dr. Silbergeld was sensitive to the predicament facing 
United States regulators, constrained as they were by 
statutes authorizing the regulation of individual chemi-
cals but effectively precluding the regulation of mixtures. 
Science, she said, had failed to give regulators the tech-
nical information they needed; her insistence that the 
original EPA guidelines include a technical report had 
been well placed. “I think I didn’t have quite the appre-
ciation I’ve gained [since then] at how limited toxicology 
is, and I got that from really understanding systematic 
methods. And systematic methods are basically a form 
of critical thinking which has never really been applied 
in toxicology”. Recently she had second-authored a criti-
cal review of toxicology, comparing it unfavorably to 
evidence-based medicine [101]. That said, and that writ-
ten, she attributed regulation’s current difficulties in part 
to external pressure. Recalling early experiences in advo-
cacy, she noted that “[d]uring my time at EDF [the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund], I saw the chemical industry 
identify ‘mechanism’ as their new tactic. Their hope [was] 
that we wouldn’t be able to figure out the mechanism for 
most things. … These agencies get set up by stakeholders, 
and they [the stakeholders] want to be in control of it [the 
regulatory process]”.
She did not wish to consider the environmental inter-
action of many thousands of industrial chemicals, calling 
that image “a googolplex”, googol being 10 raised to the 
100th power. She preferred to consider a much smaller 
number of intensively produced chemicals but was still 
resistant to considering their interaction, since no regula-
tory response was conceivable.
The EPA’s initiatives under a cumulative-risk-assess-
ment heading were less constrained than under a mix-
ture-toxicity heading because “cumulative” risks, all 
of dissimilar sorts, were not “accumulated” risks, all of 
similar sorts. Being all of dissimilar sorts, even incompat-
ible sorts, cumulative risks did not prompt the additive 
toxicological procedures applied to chemical mixtures — 
whose regulation, she insisted, current law in the United 
States, and in other countries, too, simply would not 
allow. “To regulate mixtures, the law must be changed”.
Why had EPA and other responsible agencies not tried 
to educate the public about mixture toxicity and its puta-
tive implications? Because they could not do that, nor 
could they lobby Congress. They could not initiate con-
tact in order to educate or persuade. They could only try 
to wrangle an invitation to testify at a hearing or in some 
other way inform Congressional staffers.
Are we looking through the wrong end of the tel-
escope? Was regulatory futility not so much the chal-
lenge as it was the message? Rather than obsessing 
about individual chemicals analyzed outside their com-
mercial formulations or environmental contexts, should 
we instead start planning a long careful transition to 
closed-loop — or zero-toxicant-emission — industrial 
practices? Yes, with inside-the-plant safety first assured, 
probably.
Cumulative risk conceded
Community health advocates in the 1980s had begun 
urging the EPA and state environmental agencies to 
address toxicants’ cumulative effects on disadvantaged 
populations. Some advocates became activists, first 
charging “environmental racism”, then demanding “envi-
ronmental justice”, and eventually reconceptualizing 
risk assessment [102–104]. They proceeded holistically, 
examining ignored communities, their socioeconomic 
predicaments, their health problems, and their surround-
ing industries [105]. The EPA never proceeded in this 
way. William Ruckelshaus knew its failure to do so was a 
weakness, and, following his second term as administra-
tor, he called for legislation to add such activities to the 
agency’s mandate [36].
The federal government was not deaf to these concerns. 
From Congress in 1988 came a request to the National 
Academy of Sciences to characterize whatever risks 
might be posed by pesticide residues consumed in early 
life. In 1992, President George H. W. Bush established 
the Office of Environmental Justice in the EPA. In 1993, 
the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council 
(NEJAC) began operating as a formal advisory commit-
tee chartered to advise the EPA administrator [106].
Also in 1993, in response to the Congressional request 
made 5 years prior, the NRC published Pesticides in the 
Diets of Infants and Children, its writing committee 
chaired by a pediatrician-toxicologist, Philip J. Landri-
gan, MD, MSc, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New 
York City [107]. Standard risk assessment had not ade-
quately appreciated how often and in what ways children 
“may be exposed to multiple pesticides with a common 
toxic effect” [108] and had too often ignored “additive 
and synergistic effects” [109] and the potential for pesti-
cides to be “converted in the environment or in  vivo to 
form metabolites with toxicity potentially greater than 
that of the parent compounds” [110]. Moreover, routini-
zation of the childhood diet brought into consideration 
“cumulative exposure” [111], which was more typically 
categorized as an occupational issue. Especially percep-
tive were discussions of low-level synergism and the tox-
icity of “inert ingredients” [112].
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In 1994 President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 
12,898, declaring that “each Federal agency shall make 
achieving environmental justice part of its mission by 
identifying and addressing, as appropriate, dispropor-
tionately high and adverse human health or environ-
mental effects of its programs, policies, and activities 
on minority populations and low-income populations”. 
The administrator of the EPA was to convene an intera-
gency Federal Working Group on Environmental Justice 
and, among other tasks, “conduct environmental human 
health analyses [which], whenever practicable and 
appropriate, shall identify multiple and cumulative expo-
sures” [113]. Also in 1994, the National Research Coun-
cil published Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment. 
Therein the NRC urged the EPA to reconsider its rou-
tines: “Some experts have noted that important aspects 
of risk are neglected by EPA. The agency does not appear 
to recognize the possibility of synergistic interactions 
when multiple chemical exposures occur, nor does it 
seem concerned that available data show extreme vari-
ability among individuals in their responses to toxic sub-
stances. The failure to deal with those issues can lead to 
serious underestimation of human risk, especially at very 
low exposures. A related issue is the overlooked problem 
of risk aggregation — how risks associated with multiple 
chemicals are to be combined” [114].
In August 1996 came two new statutes assigned for 
administration to the EPA, the first one suspect in origin 
and equivocal in effect.
Back in 1993, the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
the NRDC, through successful litigation, had forced the 
EPA to end its lax, or de minimis, enforcement of two 
provisions of the Food Additives Amendment of 1958, 
which had strengthened the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act of 1938. The provisions — which became 
famous jointly as the “Delaney Clause”, after their author, 
Congressman James Delaney of New York — were these:
“(3) No such regulation [prescribing safe use] shall 
issue if a fair evaluation of the data before the Secre-
tary —
“(A) fails to establish that the proposed use of the 
food additive, under the conditions of use to be 
specified in the regulation, will be safe: Provided, 
That no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it 
is found to induce cancer when ingested by man 
or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are 
appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food 
additives, to induce cancer in man or animal; or
“(B) shows that the proposed use of the additive 
would promote deception of the consumer in vio-
lation of this Act or would otherwise result in 
adulteration or in misbranding of food within the 
meaning of this Act [115].
Since the term “food additive” had been defined to 
include “a pesticide chemical”, strict enforcement of the 
Delaney Clause made legislative relief a priority for the 
pesticide industry, which lobbied vigorously for what 
would become the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, 
the FQPA.
A more presentable prompt for the FQPA had been 
Pesticides in the Diets of Infants and Children, but on 22 
May 1996 Dr. Landrigan himself opposed the bill as then 
written, noting that it required the recommendations of 
his report to be implemented but then violated its own 
requirement, in part by removing pesticides from scru-
tiny under the Delaney Clause. Dr. Landrigan, testifying 
about the bill’s Senate version, went on to castigate a pro-
vision allowing:
that a pesticide standard need not be health based 
if the imposition of a health-based standard would 
make unavailable a pesticide that is needed to 
maintain a particular food crop, “taking into 
account national and regional effects”. This small 
paragraph is a classic example of an exemption that 
eats a rule. … Mr. Chairman, as a pediatrician, I 
find this position unacceptable. … The incidence of 
cancer in America’s children is increasing. … With 
all due respect, I submit that S. 1166 is bad legisla-
tion. … I urge you not to enact this legislation [116].
The FQPA as finalized, and as passed unanimously by 
both houses of Congress in August, did not contain the 
language Dr. Landrigan had opposed, but it remained 
at best a compromise. However, it did require the EPA 
to assess the dietary risks posed to fetuses, infants, and 
children by the “cumulative effects” of pesticides having 
“a common mechanism of toxicity” and by “aggregate 
exposures” to any particular pesticide — unfortunately 
applying the terms “cumulative” and “aggregate” contrary 
to expected usage [117]. The FQPA rewrote the regula-
tion of pesticides, extensively amending FIFRA and the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to do so, and in 
its Title IV effectively removed pesticides from Delaney 
Clause jurisdiction and elaborated a new system of tol-
erances and exemptions for pesticide chemical residues. 
A “pesticide chemical”, singular, comprised “all active and 
inert ingredients”, plural. The word “inert” appeared in 
that one phrase and nowhere else [118]. The only ingredi-
ent to which the regulation of a pesticide chemical was to 
apply would still be the single chemical declared “active” 
by the manufacturer. Moreover, any distinction between 
“active” and “inert” was to be guarded as a trade secret 
and thus would not be shared with the public: “Data and 
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information … shall be entitled to confidential treatment 
for reasons of business confidentiality” [119]. The FQPA 
ignored synergy, mentioning mixtures substantively only 
in reference to nitrogen stabilizers; when in a mixture 
with fertilizers a nitrogen stabilizer had to be labeled a 
commercial product’s sole active ingredient [120]. With 
pesticide formulations once again not to be evaluated 
as mixtures, Dr. Spurrier’s 11-year-old hypothesis — 
the EPA would not study pesticides as mixtures even if 
allowed to [71] — would remain untested.
Singularly resented in the FQPA was that two or more 
toxicants encountered through individually allowable 
exposures would be recognized as potentially dangerous 
only if they shared a “common mechanism of toxicity” 
[121]. Here in this common-mechanism stipulation was 
“additivity” again, and the environmental-justice move-
ment was not willing to accept this precondition. Mech-
anisms of toxicity were not just “common”. They were 
complex: chemical stressors, yes, but social stressors, too, 
however understudied and however out-of-place they 
would seem to be in the company of chemicals [105].
Three days later came the Safe Drinking Water Act 
Amendments of 1996, the SDWAA, the second new 
statute assigned for administration to the EPA. Despite 
having been marked-up and enacted in parallel with 
the FQPA, this was unambiguously a different bill: “The 
[EPA] Administrator shall conduct biomedical stud-
ies to … develop new approaches to the study of com-
plex mixtures, such as mixtures found in drinking water, 
especially to determine the prospects for synergistic or 
antagonistic interactions that may affect the shape of 
the dose–response relationship of the individual chemi-
cals and microbes, and to examine noncancer endpoints 
and infectious diseases, and susceptible individuals and 
subpopulations”. Moreover, studies were to take “into 
account in the case of pesticides the time of application 
of the pesticide for the source water area and the travel 
time for the pesticide to reach such waters” [122].
However discordant their mandates, these new laws 
brought complementary possibilities. One required that 
cumulative risk be assessed, and the other required that 
complex mixtures be taken seriously. The EPA, in the 
environmental-justice movement’s view, now had its 
orders: catch on and catch up.
In 1997, the EPA administrator, Carol Browner, 
acknowledged that assessments had to account for com-
bined effects. She announced that efforts were underway 
to develop methods for cumulative risk assessment and 
that these efforts would lead to new guidelines. But she 
also cautioned about stretching quantitative risk assess-
ments to include social stressors: “While we can more 
consistently take into account many new factors in this 
approach to risk assessment, many other potentially 
important factors are more difficult to include in our 
analyses, particularly the social, economic, behavio-
ral or psychological factors that also may contribute to 
adverse health effects. … Assessment of these factors is 
often hampered by a lack of data to establish plausible 
cause-and-effect relationships; difficulties in measur-
ing exposure, incidence and susceptibilities related to 
these risks; and few methods for assessing or managing 
these risks. This guidance does not address these factors” 
[123]. The tension was real. The EPA already had many 
laws to obey and many different specific analyses to per-
form and was now being required by the FQPA and the 
SDWAA to add more. Pointedly, the EPA would conform 
to the FQPA’s cumulative-risk instruction but would not 
conform to activists’ pressure to incorporate adjunctive 
factors of whose suitability for toxicological study it was 
as yet unconvinced. The case for nonchemical stressors, 
Browner felt, had not been made [124].
However awkward the moment, planning and “scop-
ing” began immediately [125]. Five years later, 2002, 
came Guidance on Cumulative Risk Assessment of Pes-
ticide Chemicals That Have a Common Mechanism of 
Toxicity. The EPA had not caught on, explaining that 
“[a] cumulative risk assessment begins with the identi-
fication of a group of chemicals, a common mechanism 
group (CMG), that induce a common toxic effect by a 
common mechanism of toxicity” [126]. Additivity was 
still a precondition, headway on mixtures was minimal, 
and synergism was mentioned just twice, both times 
tangentially.
The next year, 2003, EPA published the Framework for 
Cumulative Risk Assessment, a document written to pro-
mote consistency by defining terms. It did not succeed in 
doing so. Following the FQPA [117] and still confusing, 
“aggregated” risks were repeated single-agent or single-
stressor exposures, while “cumulative” risks were multi-
ple-stressor exposures, such as to different pesticides but 
of the same sort, so as to preserve additivity. The Frame-
work did allow qualitative analysis when data were lim-
ited but otherwise stuck to familiar routines. The EPA 
now defined cumulative-risk assessment as “an analysis, 
characterization, and possible quantification of the com-
bined risks to health or the environment from multiple 
agents or stressors” [127], but this definition was predi-
cated on the four Red Book [59] steps — hazard identifi-
cation, dose–response assessment, exposure assessment, 
and risk characterization — taken to vet single chemi-
cals. After acknowledging the NRC’s admonition from 
9 years before, the Framework was quick to preempt high 
expectations: “As of August 1, 2001, there were 19,533 
pesticide products on the market … and 79,120 existing 
chemicals on the Toxic Substances Control Act inven-
tory …. Each year, a number of chemicals are added. 
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Assessing the cumulative effect of these chemicals will 
be a great challenge to to [sic] the field of risk assessment 
and to the Agency”. Paradoxically, though, the document 
acknowledged that cumulative-risk assessments were 
already being performed successfully in ecological set-
tings and in “tribal cultures” and that “[t]he framework 
[for cumulative risk assessment] itself is conceptually 
similar to the approach used in both human health and 
ecological assessments, but it is distinctive in several 
areas”. Contrary to the NRC view, the Framework dis-
missed the terms “synergism” and “antagonism,” saying, 
“These terms are only marginally useful, in part because 
the underlying toxicologic concepts are only defined for 
two-chemical mixtures, and most environmental and 
occupational exposures are to mixtures of many more 
chemicals” [127]. This last sentence, no doubt uninten-
tionally, implied that toxicological concepts were inappli-
cable where most needed.
Discouragement deepened, as standard practices 
seemed sure to mischaracterize the totality of cumulative 
health risks associated with actual exposures to diverse 
and dynamic combinations of chemical stressors — and, 
putatively, nonchemical stressors, too. Laboratory toxi-
cology could not be expected to succeed at an integrative 
task, an environmental-ecological-epidemiological task. 
Yet laboratory toxicology remained the empirical arbiter 
of toxicant regulation, although it had little to contribute 
to the study of human nonchemical stress even if medi-
ated physiologically through the autonomic nervous sys-
tem and the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis and 
even if shown to accentuate chemical stress itself.
In December 2004, NEJAC reported, at length, on 
cumulative risks and impacts [2]. Much remained tenta-
tive, with a search still on for cumulation criteria intui-
tively sensible and experimentally verifiable [128–131].
The EPA was still not catching up. Phthalates and 
Cumulative Risk Assessment: The Tasks Ahead, a 2008 
NRC report sponsored by the EPA, was blunt: “In cumu-
lative risk assessments of human health effects, there 
is a reliance on dose addition as the default approach. 
Current practices focus on well-defined mixtures of 
chemical stressors to which simultaneous (or concur-
rent) exposures occur. … [A]lthough multiple methods 
are available, EPA has used only a few of them in prac-
tice. And despite recognition of nonchemical stressors 
as potentially important contributors to cumulative risk, 
nonchemical stressors are rarely addressed or evaluated” 
[132].
Regulatory responsibility for environmental toxicants 
rested principally with the EPA. And “rested” was a verb 
fairly applied in some respects. To its credit, the EPA 
knew this and again sought advice from the National 
Research Council, which in response this time formed 
the Committee on Improving Risk Analysis Approaches 
Used by the U.S. EPA. In February 2009, the Commit-
tee published a 403-page report, Science and Decisions: 
Advancing Risk Assessment, soon nicknamed the “Silver 
Book” [133]. The Committee found much to fault.
Risk assessment practices had fallen short of the EPA’s 
own intentions. Nonchemical stressors had not been 
seriously considered, nor had person-to-person or com-
munity-to-community variation in vulnerabilities. Eco-
logical risk assessment, in which the EPA was deeply 
experienced, employed techniques applicable to human-
community risk assessment but had rarely been used in 
human communities. Interactions between chemical 
and nonchemical stressors had not often been studied 
in ways informed by epidemiological, physiological, or 
pharmacokinetic modeling [134]. Ensuring protection 
in, and of, the environment required sensitivity to signals 
of potential harm, not only characterization of identi-
fied risks [135]. Assessment of low-dose risk — whether 
eliciting a linear response or a nonlinear response — 
had shown “substantial deficiencies” [136]. A focus on 
single-chemical carcinogens — and therefore on “com-
plete” carcinogens — had critically underappreciated 
cancer’s multifactorial nature [137]. Animal data had 
not, and could not, reliably address human heterogene-
ity, whose appreciation was profoundly important when 
characterizing the risk posed by any toxicant [138]. EPA’s 
cumulative-risk assessment paradigm had not cred-
ibly considered nonchemical stressors or synergism or 
antagonism or community vulnerability or multiplicity in 
routes of exposure [139].
Appendix E of Science and Decisions recorded the 
Agency’s responses. Two were notably concessive. (1) 
“Our ability to evaluate mixtures and potential inter-
actions (other than that provided under EPA’s current 
mixtures guidance) is limited” [140]. (2) “Whole-mix-
ture studies are routinely used in ecological risk assess-
ments” [141].
Despite the NRC’s 2008 and 2009 admonitions to the 
EPA, the real-world challenge the environmental-justice 
movement most wanted addressed — the interaction of 
chemical stressors and nonchemical stressors, both of 
which were disproportionately high in disadvantaged 
communities [142] — had not attracted adequate inves-
tigational interest.
All the while, though, evidence supporting the impor-
tance of cumulative-risk assessment was mounting. As 
Dr. Silbergeld had envisioned in her 1984 critique [70], 
toxicants not sharing a “common mechanism of toxic-
ity” were more regularly being seen to exert cumulative 
effects. For example, dosing pregnant rats with mix-
tures of seven [143] — and, in a later study, ten [144] 
— antiandrogens not all sharing a common mechanism 
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of toxicity would elicit cumulative teratogenic effects 
in male pups; the effects would exceed in severity what 
would be expected if each chemical had been acting indi-
vidually, one after another, rather than together. A review 
citing work published no later than 2016 found abundant 
evidence of antiandrogens causing harm cumulatively 
and found that dose addition and response addition and 
“integrated” addition, by which the prior two additions 
were merged mathematically, could each play meth-
odological roles when evaluating antiandrogenic chemi-
cals, whatever their mechanism, at least when acting on 
androgen-dependent reproductive development [145].
The cumulative corollary as presented by NEJAC was 
necessarily, and knowingly, disruptive [64, 146, 147]. 
Chemical toxicants and nonchemical stressors might 
compound each other’s effects, but the nonchemical 
stressors nominated included ones less toxicological than 
sociological or psychological, such as poverty and adverse 
childhood experiences (ACEs) [148]. Yet others, while 
still related to poverty and adversity, were reassuringly 
pathophysiological. Malnutrition would encompass many 
examples. For instance, disadvantaged communities have 
characteristically been dependent on agro-industrially 
produced, processed, packaged, and purveyed foods, 
with which chemical toxicants have long been associated 
[149]. As reported during our study period, women with 
higher risks of toxicant carriage have disproportionately 
been members of disadvantaged communities [19].
Following a second rationale, nonchemical stress-
ors, such as anticipation of violence, if “dosed” chroni-
cally, might prove cumulative by increasing “allostatic 
load”, upsetting homeostasis, maintaining a hormonal 
stress response [150, 151], and predisposing to arterial 
hypertension and its sequelae [3, 133, 152–154]. Empiri-
cally, maternal stress in a rodent model had been found 
to worsen the effects of gestational lead exposure in 
offspring [155], and similar results had been found for 
methylmercury [156].
Following a third rationale, chemical-stressor expo-
sures made more likely by poverty and adversity might 
cause genetic mutations. Or they might cause epige-
netic changes, which alter the activity of genes — such as 
by turning them “on” or “off” — without altering genes 
themselves. Epigenetic changes are not mutations but, 
within limits, are heritable.
That last possibility was an epiphany. While required 
for the timing and regulation of normal growth, devel-
opment, and function, epigenetic changes could be dis-
advantageous and, when occurring in germ-line cells, 
could harm as many as three future generations [31, 32, 
157]. This transgenerational feature suggested — did 
not prove but legitimately suggested — that adversity 
might, to some degree, be heritable biologically as well as 
socioeconomically. Environmental-justice activism and 
cumulative-risk activism began to coalesce.
NEJAC recommended actions to “incorporate social, 
economic, cultural, and community health factors, par-
ticularly those involving vulnerability, in EPA decision-
making … and … to reduce cumulative risks and impacts 
in disadvantaged, underserved and environmentally 
overburdened communities through community-based 
and collaborative approaches” [2]. NEJAC knew that for 
poor communities environmental risk was inescapably 
cumulative, and the Framework’s concurrence, however 
provisional, marked “the maturation of environmental 
justice issues” first brought to national prominence a gen-
eration before [2]. NEJAC had reason to feel vindicated, 
even optimistic, but frustrations would prevail.
Sensitivities observed
We knew the EPA had repositioned its mixture-toxicity 
program within its cumulative-risk program but did 
not know why. The mixture-toxicity program had been 
attracting criticism for failure to engage complexity, but 
the cumulative-risk program had been attracting criti-
cism for failure to engage nonchemical stressors. Nei-
ther was proceeding smoothly, but the cumulative-risk 
program did have comparative advantages. It had a 
focussed and vocal constituency, the environmental-jus-
tice movement, and it had evidence of community-scale 
harm, assuming “the social determinants of health” [158] 
included nonchemical stressors.
To help us interpret these observations, we interviewed 
an active senior EPA officer privately and confidentially 
outside EPA headquarters 12 May 2015. Our questions 
were precise. The officer’s answers were laconic.
Had mixture toxicity been “walled off” within the EPA? 
Not consciously. Was mixture toxicity thought impos-
sible to assess? No, but EPA had no capacity to assess it 
well. Was mixture toxicity thought impossible to amelio-
rate? Yes. Or regulate? Yes. Was it politically toxic? Yes.
Had mixture toxicity been subordinated to cumula-
tive-risk assessment (CRA)? Mixture toxicity had been 
placed in the “Special Occasion” box [not ordinarily to 
be opened] while environmental justice (EJ) was being 
pushed out of CRA under a new director — ironically, 
since EJ had been the “CRA champion”.
Had a risk-assessment methods emphasis, which had 
impeded risk-management action on mixtures toxicity 
and cumulative risk, co-opted scientific critics? Maybe. 
Were scientists taking refuge in methods refinement? No. 
Politicians were.
Had CRA been designed to fail? No. Had CRA been 
designed to placate the EJ lobby? Yes. Had CRA been 
designed to occupy social scientists? No. Did CRA’s 
mechanistic diversity exculpate the chemical industry by 
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diffusing liability into ambiguous interactions of chemical 
and nonchemical factors? Maybe.
Regarding CRA and EJ, were CERCLA, and the EPA 
generally, limited by their enabling statutes? Maybe.
Stasis sustained and escaped
While it did not change the definition of “mixture” or 
remove statutory constraints on the EPA’s ability to 
evaluate mixtures, the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemi-
cal Safety for the 21st Century Act of 2016 [159] — a 
long awaited bundle of amendments to TSCA — did 
specify additional testing authority and alternative test-
ing methods, meaning methods less dependent on ver-
tebrate animals, and it did finally establish a program, 
replete with requirements and deadlines, to evaluate 
all chemicals currently in use and to ban chemicals or 
reject new ones on findings of excessive risk, with risk–
benefit claims still to be entertained but less likely to 
be dispositive. However, the distinction between active 
and “inert” ingredients — now active and “inactive” — 
remained, yet, unlike the FQPA, the Lautenberg Act 
required manufacturers to apply for the privilege of 
masking an “inactive” ingredient’s identity. Some new 
wording hinted at the obvious, that commercial formu-
lations were mixtures, but routine toxicological assess-
ment of commercial formulations rather than only their 
declared active ingredients was still not required — or 
mentioned. Much that the EPA now could do and much 
that it now had to do could not be done quickly. Some 
delays had been built in, and some would be inevitable. 
Crucially, evaluating all chemicals currently in use, or 
even just the yearly average of new chemicals for which 
a Premanufacture Notice would be filed, was far beyond 
the agency’s capacity [160].
All that said, the Lautenberg Act did open a path to 
environmental justice, at least along a chemical-stressor 
cumulative-risk dimension. Aggregate exposures and 
“the likely duration, intensity, frequency, and number of 
exposures” were to be considered [161], and “potentially 
exposed or susceptible subpopulations” were henceforth 
to receive particular attention. This new term, “poten-
tially exposed or susceptible subpopulations”, appearing 
18 times, meant “a group of individuals within the gen-
eral population identified by the Administrator who, due 
to either greater susceptibility or greater exposure, may 
be at greater risk than the general population of adverse 
health effects from exposure to a chemical substance 
or mixture, such as infants, children, pregnant women, 
workers, or the elderly” [162]. This language did not 
refer to disadvantaged communities, even obliquely, but 
groups of individuals at greater risk may be found, per-
haps disproportionately, in those communities [163]. An 
EPA administrator determined to advance environmental 
justice could now more easily find a statutory way 
forward.
Other units of the federal environmental-health estab-
lishment took their own paths. Instructively contrasting 
were the attitudes of the ATSDR and the NIEHS.
The ATSDR — the Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry, administered by the Director of the CDC 
— issued mixtures statements in 2004 and 2005 and then 
in February 2018, after our study period, released Frame-
work for Assessing Health Impacts of Multiple Chemicals 
and Other Stressors (Update) [164]. This 2018 document 
avoided the terms “synergism” and “antagonism”, which 
concepts the ATSDR attributed to experimental uncer-
tainty [165]. The authors advised that “[t]he use of 
‘greater-than-additive’ is preferred over the use of the 
term synergism … [and] ‘less-than-additive’ is preferred 
over the use of the term antagonism” [166]. The ATSDR 
authors seemed unconcerned that safety testing of indus-
trial chemicals had been negligent [167], especially when 
granting “conditional registration” for pesticides [168], 
that safety testing of marketed formulations had been rare 
[169], and that commercial pesticide formulations con-
taining ostensibly inert (or, from 2016, “inactive”) ingredi-
ents could be orders-of-magnitude more toxic than their 
declared active principal ingredients [170, 171].
Beyond seeming to be unconcerned, the ATSDR 
authors seemed to be unaware that the pesticide industry, 
by 2018, had already been shown to know that synergism 
within its formulations was real, that it was intentional, 
and that it was biocidal. In July 2016 an intensive search 
of applications for patents on pesticide formulations had 
reported that 96 of 140 (69 percent) had been described 
by their respective manufacturers as demonstrating 
ingredient synergies. These synergies, rather than going 
unmentioned out of fear that their documentation would 
increase regulatory scrutiny, were being presented to 
strengthen claims of novelty and, hence, patentability 
[172]. A year later, on 31 July 2017, internal documents — 
75 e-mails and their threads — were finally made public 
by court order during litigation concerning Monsanto’s 
(now Bayer’s) Roundup® herbicide, whose declared active 
principal ingredient, its toxicologically vetted and regu-
lated component, was glyphosate. These messages said, 
inter alia, that “the formulated product (and thus the 
surfactant) does the damage” [173] and that “surfactant 
in the formulation will come up in the tumor promo-
tion skin study because we think it played a role there” 
[174]. The focus in these comments was not glyphosate. 
The focus was the formulated product, which included 
ingredients legally classed as inactive yet credited, in the 
surfactant’s case, as pivotal to herbicidal performance 
and, worryingly, to tumor promotion in a skin study per-
formed, presumably, in nonhuman animals. Glyphosate’s 
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effect, then, was known to be enhanced by co-formula-
tion. Put differently, Roundup’s effect was known to be 
enhanced by synergism. Darkening this Monsanto story 
had been other e-mails prompting the EPA’s Inspector 
General to suspect collusion [175].
A more hopeful story may be told of a different unit.
In 2013 the National Institute of Environmental Health 
Sciences, the NIEHS, pointed proudly to a mixtures-sci-
ence record begun 30 years before, in 1983, with a study 
first-authored by the Institute’s eventual director, Linda 
Birnbaum, PhD [176]. The study had shown that a trouble-
some flame retardant “[p]reviously reported to be a single 
compound” was instead “a mixture of two closely related 
isomers” differing in toxicity [177]. Birnbaum’s discovery 
should have compelled the EPA’s Complex Mixtures Panel 
to take isomers into account but did not. Her discovery 
might also have sparked a high-priority mixtures interest 
at the NIEHS proper but did not do that either.
In 1986, though, the Institute acquired an in-house 
mixtures interest when the Superfund Research Pro-
gram (SRP) — formally the NIEHS Hazardous Substance 
Basic Research and Training Program — was established. 
Through extramural funding the SRP would support 
research bearing upon Superfund sites and, thus, bearing 
upon complex mixtures as encountered in the field and 
as modeled in the laboratory. Still, the NIEHS issued no 
“Request for Applications” (RFA) in the mixtures-toxicity 
or cumulative-risk fields until 1997 [176].
In 2009, after 19  years at the EPA, Dr. Birnbaum was 
named director of the NIEHS and its National Toxicology 
Program, the NTP, vowing “to create a holistic approach 
that can deal with the biggies, from complex mixtures of 
toxic chemicals to climate change” [178].
In 2011, a gathering called “The NIEHS Mixtures 
Workshop” signaled a new emphasis [176], and in August 
2012 the Institute published its strategic plan for the next 
5  years, 2012–2017. The plan veered sharply from the 
EPA line. “NIEHS endeavors to support environmental 
justice research, by defining the environmental factors 
and their complex interactions that contribute to envi-
ronmental health disparities, and by studying chemical 
and nonchemical stressors at the community level”. Also 
freshly on-topic were “the economic impacts of environ-
mental health risks, decisions, and policies”. A major goal 
now was understanding “how combined environmental 
exposures affect disease pathogenesis”. Not whether they 
do but how they do, such as epigenetically. The more pro-
vocative words “mixtures”, “cumulative”, “synergy”, and 
“synergism” nowhere appeared [179]. EPA’s reluctance to 
study more than two mixed toxicants, but then only simi-
lar ones, was now being set against the Institute’s com-
mitment to study whatever needed to be understood: the 
“exposome” [180], meaning the totality of an individual’s 
exposures from before conception onwards through the 
lifespan, plus the microbiome plus the genetic and epi-
genetic diversity of human vulnerability [179]. Expo-
some research would be maximally integrative. It would 
presuppose mixing in  vivo and could implicate individ-
ual and co-occurring toxicants by associating them with 
harm in straightforward clinical-pathological fashion.
By 2013 a review of mixtures research at the NIEHS 
showed a gratifying variety: “Some examples of the types 
of mixtures studied include: groundwater contaminants, 
pesticides/fertilizers, dioxin-like chemicals (assessing 
the toxic equivalency approach), drug combinations, air 
pollution, metals, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, 
technical mixtures (e.g. pentachlorophenol, flame retard-
ants), and mixed entities (e.g. herbals, asbestos)” [181]. A 
mixtures-in-epidemiology conference followed in 2015 
[182], as did a low-dose-theory symposium focused on 
the Halifax Project [33]. Dr. Birnbaum began this last 
listed event by declaring “The toxicology of the twenty-
first century should not be the toxicology of the twentieth 
century” [183]. Further events would follow [184].
Finalized in October 2016 was an ambitious new mul-
tidisciplinary research concept the NIEHS called PRIME, 
for “Powering Research through Innovative Methods 
for mixtures in Epidemiology” [185]. Applications for 
PRIME grants were reviewed beginning 22 January 2017 
[186], and many were funded.
All that said and done, the NIEHS was built for inves-
tigation, not regulation. NIEHS could affect policy only 
with scientific evidence, not with legal authority, and was 
still not of one mind. As late as 27 April 2017, an NIEHS 
webinar on complex environmental mixtures opened 
with the EPA’s 1986 Guidelines. Progress since 1986 was 
being described mostly as refinement in additivity: mod-
ernizing the search for pollutants exhibiting common 
behaviors so as to reduce the dimensions of whatever sta-
tistical model was to be estimated [187].
The next NIEHS strategic plan, for 2018–2023, would 
be shorter, less expansive, and more cautious, with “mix-
tures” snuck back in only to explain the meaning of “com-
bined exposures” [188]. Dr. Birnbaum would relinquish 
her directorships, but not her research, in 2019 [189]. She 
would not have resigned, she would explain in February 
2021, had she not grown “tired of being so tightly con-
trolled” [190].
Stasis interpreted
Why had the federal environmental-health establish-
ment for so long been so reluctant to correct its perspec-
tive? We asked Thomas A. Burke, PhD, MPH, the Jacob 
I. and Irene B. Fabrikant Professor and Chair in Health 
Risk and Society in the Department of Health Policy and 
Management at the Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg 
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School of Public Health. Dr. Burke is jointly appointed in 
the Department of Environmental Health Sciences and 
the Department of Oncology in the School of Medicine 
and directs the Johns Hopkins Risk Sciences and Public 
Policy Institute. He chaired the NRC’s Committee on 
Improving Risk Analysis Approaches Used by the U.S. 
EPA and supervised the writing of Science and Decisions, 
the “Silver Book”. He was nominated by President Barack 
Obama to serve as EPA Assistant Administrator for the 
Office of Research and Development and from January 
2015 until January 2017 was the EPA’s Science Advisor 
and its Deputy Assistant Administrator for Research and 
Development. The United States Senate never voted on 
Dr. Burke’s nomination; he served without confirmation 
and resigned upon change of administrations. We met 
with Dr. Burke in his office 18 June 2019 for an hour and 
a quarter along with his Hopkins colleague, Mary Fox, 
PhD, MPH, an expert in environmental mixture toxicity, 
its putative relationship to racial and ethnic health dis-
parities, and cumulative risk overall.
“There’s enormous concern about cumulative risk in 
general from industry”, Dr. Burke said, “[and] there always 
has been”. The agricultural-chemical industry exhibited 
a “dread of epidemiology”, which was “really the only 
science that addresses cumulative risk”, meaning that 
toxicology did not, “and was detecting risks — say, for 
non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma related to Roundup or glypho-
sate — that might be really an indication of true elevation 
of risk in workers that are exposed to a really complicated 
mixture [a declared active principal ingredient plus its 
“inactive” co-formulants] and have the other social factors 
and healthcare factors that put them at increased risk. … 
There was tangible anxiety about … really difficult regu-
latory implications. … I can tell you virtually every major 
issue I dealt with at EPA was a cumulative-risk issue. … 
I would have to say from a science perspective I felt very 
good that cumulative [risk] — not the social aspects of 
risk but from a chemical perspective — [was included 
in] the problem definition [of] almost every major issue. 
Now, frankly, that doesn’t mesh well with the regulatory 
mandates of the agency, so that makes it difficult because 
the regulatory mandates are very substance-specific, 
agent-specific. … The statutes [establishing the EPA’s reg-
ulatory mandates] are the antithesis of cumulative risk”.
What would Dr. Burke do if political circumstances 
ever favored concerted action?
He would overhaul TSCA, even as revised in 2016 by 
the Lautenberg Act. Senator Lautenberg died in office 
in 2013, and his namesake act was passed in a form 
equivocal with respect to mixtures and, more broadly, 
cumulative risk. And, in effect, it prohibited state-level 
leadership.
Dr. Burke would shift safety’s “burden of proof” from 
the EPA to industry. He would rehabilitate the EPA’s orig-
inal “best available technology” engineering mandate and 
deemphasize its “risk assessment” toxicology mandate, 
the latter dominant since 1983 but easily impeded legal-
istically. He would require “systems thinking”, such as he 
himself has facilitated by empaneling the Environmental 
Health Matters Initiative, the EHMI, within the National 
Academy of Sciences.
Dr. Burke noted that public education has not hereto-
fore been in the EPA’s mandate, but he thought it could 
be put there. “It [leadership, including public educa-
tion] comes from the top [meaning the presidency] and 
[would require] a fully functioning science infrastruc-
ture [including the CDC] that has a strong public-health 
component to make it work”. Decisive action, such as a 
transition to closed-loop industrial production and non-
production of egregious toxicants, “is way bigger than a 
regulatory agency”.
Conclusions
The United States federal environmental-health estab-
lishment had already lost much of its ability to respond 
effectively to the harms studied here before it ever 
thought to do so.
Congress had defined pesticide formulations, which 
were chemical mixtures, as single entities and had lim-
ited regulators’ examinations to only those ingredients 
declared to be “active”. It had defined any chemical mix-
ture restrictively, excluding from study environmental 
mixtures reacting to form “new” chemical substances. 
And it had allowed any mixture to be assessed simply 
by characterizing, or referencing past characterizations 
of, its individual components, unless top management 
directed otherwise.
The Supreme Court complicated matters for envi-
ronmental regulators — but also simplified matters for 
them — by striking down OSHA’s inadequately explained 
requirement that polluters reduce their emissions to the 
lowest technologically feasible levels they could afford. 
Conscientious regulation of no-safe-dose toxicants 
became harder to envision than it would otherwise have 
been, when regulating toward zero was disallowed. For 
whatever reasons, the environmental-health establish-
ment never did formulate a new standard that avoided 
OSHA’s past errors, despite what seemed a reasonable 
chance of success under review by a future court.
These constraints, statutory and judicial, had come 
into place five months before Superfund was created. 
Recognizing an obligation to respond scientifically to 
the challenge presented by management of sites con-
taminated by complex mixtures, the EPA convened a 
group to consider mixture toxicity and write guidelines 
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for assessment of risk. But the EPA had already grown 
accustomed to its constraints and showed little interest 
in escaping them, evidently because constraints were 
also now internal, even self-imposed. Efforts to write 
guidelines for evaluating mixture toxicity and later 
for evaluating cumulative risk displayed a fear that 
toxicology’s methods would be set adrift by requiring 
the assessment of multiple toxicants mixed in multi-
ple ratios encountered in multiple exposures. Even if 
assessment were to venture beyond single chemicals, 
regulation seemed sure to be futile if any chemical’s 
safety were seen as contingent upon the presence or 
absence of some number of other chemicals in various 
amounts. Assessing and regulating chemicals one-by-
one was hard enough; assessing and then regulating 
chemicals in mixtures promised to be exponentially 
harder, even impossible without reconceptualization of 
both regulatory mission and strategy.
Embracing complexity would have required the EPA to 
sponsor research questioning its own practices and dis-
quieting industries adapted to those practices. Yet one 
other unit, the NIEHS, did assertively commit itself to 
embracing complexity analytically and environmental 
justice more than rhetorically. Had it been encouraged 
to do so, the NIEHS might with programmatic research 
have begun to lay an evidentiary basis for fundamental 
regulatory reform.
Mixture toxicity and related issues presented to regula-
tors an infinitude of interactions — Silbergeld’s “googol-
plex” — whose sorting, both scientifically and legally, was 
impossible. Yet impossibility was not the problem. Impos-
sibility was the message, one we can still read, and with 
ever sharper acuity. If toxicants cannot be accepted within 
the environment then toxicants must not be accepted into 
the environment. However facile it may seem initially, this 
deduction teaches — to industry, to agriculture, to a self-
governing citizenry — an actionable lesson: minimize the 
exposome by, first, decelerating its expansion.
Achieving even this much would require a salient 
intrusion into policy-as-usual and a robust commitment 
to end science-by-statute. Presidential and congressional 
cooperation would be needed and could be slow in com-
ing. Agency-level initiatives could be more promising.
We did confirm the importance of statutory con-
straint, but we also found statutory contrast and oppor-
tunity, most obviously in two bills enacted in 1996 and a 
third enacted in 2016. The Food Quality Protection Act 
required cumulative-risk assessment. The Safe Drink-
ing Water Act Amendments required complex-mix-
ture assessment with pesticides not excluded. And the 
Lautenberg Act required particular attention be paid 
to potentially exposed or susceptible subpopulations, 
opening a path to environmental-justice analytics and 
interventions. These three requirements, as supported 
by the persistent prodding of the National Research 
Council, could form a premise for action by a future, or 
by the current, EPA administrator. In parallel, the argu-
ment OSHA failed to make persuasively to the Supreme 
Court with respect to benzene in 1980 could be remade 
more broadly and with four decades of subsequent sci-
ence to back it up; if so, then no-safe-dose toxicants 
could once again have their emissions driven toward 
zero, and low-dose exposures could come within the 
range of management.
Regulatory science agencies and research science 
agencies are different, but they are not obliged to be 
as different as they have become. The most immediate 
need, we found, is for toxicologists to work with — not 
apart from and not in opposition to — epidemiologists, 
physiologists, endocrinologists, pathologists, and field 
biologists, all laboring to protect the environment from 
us and us from the environment.
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